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PREPARING FOR BIOINFORMATICS
LITIGATION: HOW WILL THE COURTS





Society will likely view the past decade as the birth of the In-
ternet Age. The next ten years, however, will be seen as the golden
age of biotechnology. With the advances that will soon occur in ge-
netic technology, scientists will work on projects that once would have
sounded like science fiction, and entrepreneurs will appear out of the
woodwork in order to try to amass their fortunes.' Part of these entre-
preneurs' strategies will involve procuring patents. Where there is a
patent, there is a potential for patent litigation.
Biotechnology patent litigation has always been complex. It is
about to become even more complicated. Biotechnology is increas-
ingly becoming dominated by genetic technology and intertwined with
information systems and vast sources of data. This is causing a boom
in fields such as bioinformatics, which typically focuses on "sequence-
based extraction of specific patterns or motifs and also on specific pat-
t This article is an updated version of an article that was first presented at the IBC
USA Conferences Annual Symposium on Pharmacogenomics, SNPs & Genetic Patenting,
May 31- June 2, 2000. That article was entitled When the Human Genome Project and State
Street Collide: Preparing for the Next Generation of Biotechnology Patent Litigation.
t Scott D. Locke is an associate at Kalow & Springut LLP and was educated at Brown
University (A.B., Biology, magna cum laude, Sigma Xi, 1991) and the University of Penn-
sylvania School of Law (J.D., 1995). His practice concentrates on patent litigation and
prosecution, trade secrets, and copyright law. E-mail: slocke@creativity-law.com.
§ David A. Kalow is a partner at Kalow & Springut LLP and was educated at the
University of Chicago (B.A., 1974, J.D. 1976). His practice concentrates on litigating and
licensing intellectual property in the biotechnology and computer industries, and counsel-
ing clients on efficient strategies for intellectual property protection of trade secrets, busi-
ness planning, and transactional matters. E-mail: dak@creativity-law.com.
1 The Human Genome Project: Benefiting All Humanity, 21, March 14, 2000, The
White House Office of the Press Secretary ("The potential for commercial development of
genomics research also presents U.S. industry with a wealth of opportunities, and sales of
DNA-based products and technologies in the biotechnology industry are expected to ex-
ceed $45 billion by 2009.").
BIOINFORMATICS LITIGATION
tern matching."'2 Players with foresight have begun and will continue
to seek not only the predictable biotechnology patent claims to com-
positions and methods of diagnosis and treatments, but also claims to
processing of information. These processing of information claims
should and will likely more resemble software and business method
patents than traditional biotechnology patents. This may help to sat-
isfy the demanding requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, as they have been
applied to what have been viewed as the relatively unpredictable ge-
netic/biotechnology patents, and to provide courts with the opportu-
nity for upholding more patents. It may also allow courts to focus on
the policy of broad inclusion of what is patentable, as described in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. ,3
when defendants raise their inevitable challenges to utility and
patentability.
The occurrence of three events in the past few years set the
groundwork for the next generation of biotechnology patents to is-
sue-the bioinformatics patents,4 which will provide the subject mat-
ter for this next generation of biotechnology patent litigation. First, in
1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office announced that
it would allow claims on expressed sequence tags ("ESTs") based on
their utility as probes.5 This sparked the increase in the filing of ge-
netic-related applications.
6
Second, in 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
handed down State Street.7 In State Street, the court clearly stated that
tangible applications of mathematical algorithms and business meth-
2 Aris Persidis, Data Mining in Biotechnology, 18 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 237
(2000).
3 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
4 Patents in this field have already begun to issue. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 6,141,657,
Method and Apparatus for Identifying Classifying or Quantifying DNA Sequences in a
Sample Without Sequencing, issued October 31, 2000, assigned to Curagen Corp.; U.S. Pat.
No. 6,125,383, Research System Using Multi-platform Object Oriented Program Language
for Providing Objects at Runtime for Creating and Manipulating Biological or Chemical
Data, issued September 26, 2000, assigned to Netgenics Corp.; U.S. Pat. No. 6,023,659,
Database System Employing Protein Function Hierarchies for Viewing Biomolecular Se-
quence Data, issued February 8, 2000, assigned to Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; U.S. Pat.
No. 5,970,500, Database and System for Determining, Storing and Displaying Gene Locus
Information, issued October 19, 1999, assigned to Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; U.S. Pat.
No. 5,966,712, Database and System for Storing, Comparing and Displaying Genomic In-
formation, issued October 12, 1997, assigned to Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
5 Dorothy R. Auth, Are ESTs Patentable? 15 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 911 (1997);
see also "SNPs" Are Next Focus of Intellectual Property Debate Among Researchers, 60
THE PINK SHEET 20 (1998) ("The Patent & Trademark Office has since ruled that gene
fragments or expressed sequence tags, can be patented for diagnostic purposes.").
6 These patents and other DNA-related patents have provided the subject matter for
the developing body of "genetic/biotechnology" case law.
7 149 F.3d 1368.
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ods, as well as data processing and computer programs, were patenta-
ble. At first blush one may not see the relevance to biotechnology.
But as databases that contain programs that manipulate genetic infor-
mation grow, so too will the methods by which people use them. Bio-
technology entrepreneurs with foresight will draft patent applications
directed both to the data and to their uses.8
Third, the first stage of the Human Genome Project has been
completed. 9 This has put a significant amount of information in the
scientific community and will provide countless opportunities for bio-
technology entrepreneurs. Attempting to encourage the introduction
of this information into the public sphere, President Clinton and
Prime Minister Blair issued a joint statement recommending that "raw
fundamental data on the human genome, including the human DNA
sequence and its variations, should be made freely available to scien-
tists everywhere."' 1
With these three events having occurred, now is the time for the
genetic/biotechnology industry to plan actively how to craft its patents
for maximum protection. In order to do this, the industry must under-
stand how the courts have approached biotechnology patents in gen-
eral and be prepared for how the courts will approach bioinformatics
patents. Below are (I) a survey of the unique areas of genetic/biotech-
nology case law of which all genetic/biotechnology patent litigants
should be aware, (II) an explanation of State Street and its importance
to the biotechnology industry, and (III) predictions for the future.
8 Patents are not the only means for protecting one's intellectual property. For exam-
ple, databases, which are important in the field of bioinformatics, are protectable under
copyright law to the extent that they are original compilations. 17 U.S.C. § 101. However,
the protection does not extend to the underlying data. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publish-
ing Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999). Additionally,
one should note that foreign nations including those of the European Union have explored
other means for protecting databases.
Persons who work in the world of bioinformatics should be aware that some degree of
protection is available for databases through the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act if the database contains a "technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under [Title 17 of the U.S. Code]." 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201. Thus, even though copyright protection does not extend to the underlying data in a
database, it does extend to the selection and arrangement of those data, thereby bringing
most databases within the protection of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and afford-
ing them the same protections under that provision as all other copyrighted works. 65 Fed.
Reg. 64556, 64566.
9 President Clinton Announces the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human
Genome, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 25, 2000.
10 Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the U.K., The




A patent litigation can be thought of as containing five major
components: (1) claim construction, (2) validity, (3) infringement, (4)
damages, and (5) counterclaims and affirmative defenses." Each of
these subjects merits a separate discussion; however, only the second
will be addressed in this article. 12
A patent may be declared invalid on a number of grounds; the
four most important ones for genetic/biotechnology litigants are obvi-
ousness, inventorship, enablement, and written description. Thus far,
the courts have been focusing on patents for, and related to, DNA and
protein sequences; bioinformatics patents have not yet made their way
to the courts. But when they do, the courts will be likely to use the
cases described below as a starting point.
13
A. Obviousness
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent is invalid if it is obvious in light
of the prior art. "The foundational facts for the prima facie case of
obviousness are: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the
difference between the prior art and the claimed invention; and (3)
the level of ordinary skill in the art."'1 4 From a scientist's point of view,
11 Courts typically phrase their analyses as two-pronged: (i) construction of the claims,
and (ii) comparison of the claims to the accused product. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v, Berkline
Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, when preparing for a case, the au-
thors believe that this five-part analysis is more practical.
12 Before addressing the specific issues unique to genetic/biotechnology case law, one
should consider a number of issues that must be kept in mind in any litigation. First, litiga-
tion is about telling a true story persuasively. Regardless of how good the facts may be, if
one cannot convey them to a judge or a jury, one will have difficulties. This requires a
litigant to review the facts both as persons remember them and as they appear in docu-
ments. It also requires the finding of and working with experts who are credible and pre-
sentable to the judge and jury.
Second, litigation involves time and money. The process can take years and will tap
both monetary and person-hour resources.
Third, litigation involves discovery, which includes disclosure of documents, including
electronic documents and depositions. Someone will review old documents, lab notebooks,
and electronic files. Once the litigation has started, little can be done about the content of
the documents. Thus, when one writes anything, regardless of whether there is litigation
pending, one should remember that one's employer, its lawyers, and its adversaries may
someday read it.
13 The case law discussed herein includes cases between litigants in federal courts, as
well as Interference proceedings and ex parte proceedings within, and appealed from, the
Patent and Trademark Office.
14 In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidity found for patent relat-
ing to proteins). A court may also consider secondary considerations, if any, of nonobvi-
ousness. Boehringer Animal Health, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 984 F. Supp. 239, 254
(D.N.J. 1997). These considerations may include evidence of commercial success of the
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under this standard, the DNA sequence of a gene in many circum-
stances may appear to be obvious.15 This reaction is often due to the
degeneracy of the genetic code; there are only a finite number of pos-
sibilities for the sequence of a gene once the protein sequence is
known. Thus, once a protein sequence is known, its DNA sequence
might require work to find (including finding the gene), but it is gener-
ally knowable.
The Federal Circuit, however, has been more generous than one
unfamiliar with the patent laws might have predicted, 16 and patents
for DNA sequences have been and will continue to be awarded. 17 A
claim to a specific DNA sequence is not made obvious by mere knowl-
edge of a desired protein sequence in combination with methods for
generating the DNA that encodes that protein. 18 In In re Bell, the first
of the two seminal Federal Circuit cases addressing the obviousness
requirement as applied to genetic/biotechnology patents, the Federal
Circuit explicitly rejected the proposition that "the established rela-
tionship in the genetic code between a nucleic acid and the protein it
encodes also makes a gene prima facie obvious over its correspondent
protein."'19
In In re Deuel,20 the second of the two seminal cases on obvi-
ousness and genetic/biotechnology technology, the applicants' inven-
tion related "to isolated and purified DNA and cDNA molecules that
encoded heparin-binding growth factors ('HBGF')."' The applicants
decoded HBGF from bovine uterine tissue and human placental tis-
invention, satisfying a long-felt need, failure of others to find a solution to the problem,
and copying of the invention by others. Id.
15 Scientists who want to procure patents should be cautioned not to put these thoughts
in writing.
16 Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Pro-
tecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 152-
53 (2000) (in biotechnology industry, non-obviousness hurdle has become easy to
overcome).
17 See U.S. Patent Policy Unaffected by US/UK Statement on Human Gene Sequence
Data, U.S.P.T.O. Press Release #00-17, March 16, 2000.
18 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("A prior art disclosure of the
amino acid sequence of a protein does not necessarily render particular DNA molecules
encoding the protein obvious because the redundancy of the genetic code permits one to
hypothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences coding for the protein. No particular
one of these DNAs can be obvious unless there is something in the prior art to lead to the
particular DNA and indicate that it should be prepared."). Deuel is not without its critics.
See e.g., Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. at 154; John Murray,
Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 231, 247
(1999).
19 In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
20 51 F.3d 1552. In re Deuel was not a litigation, but instead an appeal from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interference.
21 Id. at 1554.
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sue.22 One prior art reference disclosed "a group of protein growth
factors designated as heparin-binding brain mitogens. ' 23 A second
prior art reference disclosed a method for isolating DNA and
cDNA.
2 4
The Federal Circuit took the opportunity to clarify its position
that knowledge of a protein sequence does not necessarily render a
DNA sequence obvious and "the [existence] of a general method of
isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the
question whether the specific molecules themselves would have been
obvious in the absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed
DNAs. '25 It then held that the cDNA molecules that were claimed
were not obvious in light of the prior art.26 Realizing the breadth of its
decision, the court also noted: "This is not to say that a gene is never
rendered obvious when the amino acid sequence of its coded protein
is known ... [e.g., when] a known amino acid sequence is specified
exclusively by unique codons, the gene might... [be] obvious. '27 This
is consistent with the general rule that an invention that is only "obvi-
ous to try" is not unpatentable.
28
Although in 1993, in In re Bell, the Federal Circuit announced
clearly that it believed that DNA sequences may be patentable, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences provided an example of
when a DNA sequence would be obvious in light of a known protein
sequence. In Ex parte Movva, 29 the Board noted two factors that sug-
gested and supported a finding that a prior art rejection based on a
probing DNA library was appropriate. First, the gene of interest was
part of the family of mammalian genes, and at least three of those
mammalian genes showed highly conserved regions.30 Second, "the
prior art had successfully isolated similar genes of interest using
probes based upon one of these known nucleotide sequences. 31
Ex parte Movva is not prominently cited in the literature or case
law. But as more sequences enter the public sphere, each new se-
quence has a greater chance of being easier to predict in light of what
22 Id. at 1555.
23 Id. at 1556.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1559.
26 Id. at 1560.
27 In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. The Federal Circuit continued: "We express no opinion
concerning the reverse proposition, that knowledge of the structure of a DNA, e.g., a
cDNA, might make a coded protein obvious." Id. at 784 n.6.
28 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559; Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 256.
29 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1027 (Bd. Pt. App. & Int. 1993).
30 Id. at 1030.
31 ld.
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is known. Thus, potential applicants should continue to file applica-
tions for DNA and DNA-related patents, and defendants should al-
ways assert that patents for sequences are obvious.32 Soon, the
defendants may prevail.
B. Inventorship
In order for there to be an invention, there must be conception.
In terms of patent law, conception requires that an inventor "had a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention"
and that "the inventor's idea, as defined and preserved, enables one of
ordinary skill in the art to reduce the invention to practice. ' 33 The
inventor must have "both the idea of the invention's structure and
possession of an operative method of making it.''34 An inventor's sub-
jective belief that her or his invention will work is irrelevant. 35
The notion of conception is important for two reasons. First, an
inventor must have conceived of the invention prior to filing the appli-
cation. Failure to have done so is grounds for invalidity. Second, be-
cause, under U.S. Patent Law, priority is given to the first to invent
and not the first to file, it is important to determine when an invention
is conceived. 36 As genetic/biotechnology becomes a more and more
lucrative endeavor, increasing numbers of persons will enter the field.
This in turn will increase the number of inventions and the rate at
which inventions will be discovered, which in turn will increase the
number of disputes over who first invented a particular invention.
The Federal Circuit first confronted the issue of what it means to
have conception of a gene in Amgen v. Chugai.37 There, the court,
drawing support from the application of the law of conception to
chemical compounds, held: "A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a
32 See also Ex parte Goldgaber, 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1172 (Bd. Pt. App. & Int. 1996) (DNA
sequence was obvious).
33 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1130 (1995). See also, Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibo-
dies, 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting 1 Robinson on Patents 532 (1890):
Conception is the "formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea
of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice."), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
34 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied sub nom., Genetics Inst. v. Amgen, 502 U.S. 856 (1991).
35 Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1554.
36 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Applicants should note that in many foreign countries, the in-
quiry focuses on who is the first to file, not the first to invent. Therefore, inventors should
not unnecessarily delay filing applications. Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-To-File
Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67, 73 (1997) ("In contrast with the United
States, nearly every other country in the world utilizes a first to file system of priority.").
37 927 F.2d 1200.
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complex one, and it is well established in our law that conception of a
chemical compound requires that the inventor be able to define it so
as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe [how to ob-
tain] it. ' '38
One of the claims was directed to a "purified and isolated DNA
sequence"; however, the inventors had only an idea as to a general
approach for screening a DNA library that might be used to identify
and to clone the gene.39 They did not know its sequence. The court
emphasized: "[W]hen an inventor is unable to envision the detailed
constitution of a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as
well as a method for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved
until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has
been isolated. ' 40 Thus, an applicant should not prematurely file an
application claiming nucleotide sequences. However, an applicant
should consider filing method claims even before identifying the exact
DNA sequence. There are procedures such as continuation-in-part ap-
plications to claim the sequence when it is discovered.
The Federal Circuit revisited the issue of conception with respect
to genes two years later in Fiers v. Revel, 41 where, in the context of an
Interference proceeding, the court reaffirmed the holding of Amgen,
again noting that conception of a DNA sequence cannot be by its
functional utility.42 The court reemphasized that the existence of a
workable method for preparing DNA does not establish conception of
that material. 4
3
Under U.S. Patent Law, one is concerned with not only concep-
tion, but also reduction to practice. For a number of years, according
to some courts, inventions that cover biological substances were
viewed as not having been conceived prior to their reduction to prac-
tice.44 However, as the Federal Circuit has become more comfortable
38 Id. at 1206.
39 Id. at 1206-1207.
40 Id. at 1206.
41 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
42 Id. at 1169.
43 Id. See also, Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[W]ithout any
molecular weight or other probative data relevant to the composition or structure of the
molecule [the applicant] allegedly prepared, there is insufficient evidentiary support for
Schendel's conclusory assertion that he made an IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein."). The Fed-
eral Circuit has noted that other than identifying a sequence, conception may occur when
one is able to define a chemical by its "method of preparation" if the DNA is claimed by its
method of preparation. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171. Thus, conception of a substance per se,
claimed without reference to a process, requires conception of its structure, name, formula,
or definitive chemical or physical properties. Id.
44 Brown v. Regents of University of California, 866 F. Supp. 439, 442-443 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Regents of University of California v. Synbiotics Corp., 849 F. Supp. 740, 742 (S.D.
Summer 2001]
84 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:76
with genetic/biotechnology, this may have begun to change. For a nat-
urally occurring gene sequence, or an EST or SNP (single nucleotide
polymorphism), there may be no conception without a simultaneous
reduction to practice, 45 but for DNA constructs, such as probes with
defined functional regions, conception and reduction to practice may,
as they are in the context of most inventions, be distinct events.
Recently, in Singh v. Brake,46 another appeal from the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Federal Circuit addressed the
issue of inventorship in the context of an invention of a DNA con-
struct comprising a DNA encoding alpha factor leading sequence, a
spacer, and a gene foreign to yeast.47 In September and October of
1982, when Singh, one of the parties to an Interference, was working
on his idea, he learned that eight additional amino acids were being
produced in the translated product, and he needed to develop a means
to remove these additional amino acids. Singh alleged that he con-
ceived of the invention on approximately October 1, 1982, when he
first learned of this problem and when, according to him, he thought
of a solution using "loop deletion mutagenesis." He asserted that evi-
dence in his lab notebooks from November and December supported
that he had conceived of the invention prior to January 1983. Singh
filed his patent application on June 20, 1983. Brake, the other party to
the Interference, filed a patent application on January 12, 1983.
The two main pieces of evidence were documents in Singh's labo-
ratory notebook: (a) an articulation of the problem on November 24,
1982; and (b) Singh's ordering of Synthetic DNA Request for a partic-
ular oligonucleotide sequence to incorporate into the construct, with a
notation explaining the intended use.48 Two issues surrounded this ev-
idence. First, there was an issue as to whether the second piece of
evidence could be used to corroborate the conception under a theory
that the sequence had no other substantial use than to accomplish
Cal. 1994) (conception did not occur because the inventor had neither isolated the virus at
issue nor reduced the concept to practice).
45 See Synbiotics, 849 F. Supp. at 742; see also, Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 442-443. The
Federal Circuit explained:
Under these circumstances, the reduction to practice can be the most definitive
corroboration of conception, for where the idea is in constant flux, it is not
definite and permanent. A conception is not complete if the subsequent course
of experimentation, especially experimental failures, reveals uncertainty that
so undermines the specificity of the inventor's idea that it is not yet a definite
and permanent reflection of the complete invention as it will be used in
practice.
Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1229.
46 Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
47 Id. at 1363-64.
48 Id. at 1365.
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loop deletion. Second, there was an issue as to whether the laboratory
notebooks were useable as corroborative evidence, because they were
dated years after the entries were made.
The Board held that Singh had not conceived of his invention
prior to Brake's filing of his patent application; the Federal Circuit
vacated the decision and remanded. 49 With respect to the first issue,
the court extended the doctrine of no other substantial use, making it
available for corroboration of conception as it had been available to
corroborate reduction to practice. 50 With respect to the second issue,
the court held that the Board erred in not considering the lab
notebook entries, and that a totality of the corroborative evidence
should have been considered-the lack of contemporary dating was
only one factor. 51 In discussing the value of the undated lab note-
books, the court reopened the door for the separate analysis of con-
ception and reduction to practice with respect to gene-related
inventions. It noted that although the lab notebooks might not have
satisfied the requirement for evidence to corroborate reduction to
practice, they could corroborate conception, which had a lower re-
quirement for corroboration. 52 The different standards implicitly dic-
tate that with respect to DNA constructs, unlike gene sequences,
conception does not necessarily require simultaneous reduction to
practice.
From a practical perspective, this means three things. First, scien-
tists should isolate and characterize a gene or sequence as early as
possible. Second, patent applicants should not file applications claim-
ing nucleotide sequences before they have the nucleotide sequences
identified and characterized. 53 However, the standard for simultane-
ous conception and reduction to practice for DNA sequences is not
necessarily extendable to other DNA-related inventions. Third, docu-
mentation is important; courts and one's adversaries will cite lab note-
books as evidence of invention or support to invalidate a patent.54
49 Id. at 1370.
50 Id. at 1369. The doctrine of no substantial use holds that "when a putative inventor
has obtained specific reagents with no 'substantial use' other than to make the claimed
chemical compound, that evidence is of significant corroborative value." Id.
51 Id. at 1370.
52 Id. ("the standard of proof required to corroborate a reduction to practice, a more
stringent standard that than required to corroborate a conception").
53 Conception and enablement are distinct issues, but an enabling disclosure can be
used to confirm conception. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1231.
54 See, e.g., Purdue et al. v. Boehringer et al., 98 F. Supp. 2d 362, 384-386 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (analyzing testimony, declarations, and documents to determine conception and re-
duction to practice).
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C. Enablement
A patent specification must "enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains" to practice the invention. 55 The hypothetical per-
son skilled in the art must be able to practice the invention without
undue experimentation; however, the need to conduct some experi-
mentation is not fatal.56 With respect to DNA-related patents the
courts have imposed a high bar.
Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute an ena-
bling disclosure. While every aspect of a generic claim certainly
need not have been carried out by an inventor, or exemplified in the
specification, reasonable detail must be provided in order to enable
members of the public to understand and carry out the invention.
57
But genetic sequences can be valid where they are of a scope appro-
priate to the invention disclosed by an applicant.58 From a practical
perspective, an applicant must show examples of more than a single
organism in order to claim more.
5 9
In Enzo v. Calgene,60 Enzo appealed a decision that its claims
pertaining to antisense technology were not enabled. Enzo's claims
were directed to antisense technology generally, while the court
thought that the specification contained little direction and only nar-
row working examples of applications outside of E. coli. In upholding
the finding of invalidity based on a lack of enablement, the Federal
Circuit noted:
What is glaringly "missing" from the specifications is the disclosure
of any direction or examples of how such an idea might be imple-
mented in any cell other than E. coli .... [The] disclosure of practic-
ing antisense in E. coli does not suffice to enable the practice of
antisense in all categories of living matter. 61
55 35 U.S.C. § 112.
56 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212. Factors to consider for whether there is undue experimen-
tation include: "(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction
or guidance, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) nature of the invention,
(5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims." Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737
(Fed. Cir. 1988)) (patents were invalid for trying to claim all of antisense technology).
These factors are illustrative, not mandatory. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213.
57 Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1374-1375 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d
1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997)). But what is unpredictable now
may later become predictable. Id. at 1375 n.10.
58 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214.
59 Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1375.
60 Id. at 1362. One of the authors, David A. Kalow, was part of the trial team in the
Enzo case.
61 Id. at 1375.
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Enzo and other case law reflect an unease of the courts with how
to address the relationship between a genus and species with respect
to biotechnology. For example, in the context of claims related to pro-
teins, the single example of producing gamma-interferon in the dicoty-
ledonous species of tobacco was held not to enable a biotechnician of
ordinary skill to produce any type of mammalian protein in any type
of plant cell. 6
2
But the Federal Circuit has also held that it is well settled that
patent applicants are not required to disclose every species encom-
passed by their claims, even in an unpredictable art.63 Further, the
Federal Circuit has noted that it "[does] not imply that patent appli-
cants in art areas currently denominated as 'unpredictable' [will]
never be allowed generic claims encompassing more than the particu-
lar species disclosed in their specification. '64
This fine line between disclosing a species and claiming a genus
suggests four things. First, applicants should disclose as many species
as possible. Second, in a litigation, patent holders should emphasize
the similarity between species. Third, alleged infringers should always
argue that disclosure of one or a limited number of species does not
enable the broad genus or other species. Fourth, defendants should
look for problems confronted by the inventor or any skilled-in-the-art
third party in practicing the invention in the same or other species.65
D. Written Description
In addition to enabling one skilled in the art to practice the inven-
tion, a patent specification must also provide a written description of
the invention.66 The specification must clearly indicate that the "in-
ventor invented the claimed invention. ' 67 This requirement demands
that the applicant describe the invention with all of its claimed limita-
tions, and not only by describing what makes it obvious.68
There is an intuitive but unfortunately erroneous and asymmetri-
cal relationship between the written description requirement of 35
62 In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
63 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
64 Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1374 n.10 (quoting Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496).
65 Cf Johns Hopkins University et al. v. Cell Pro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Alleged infringer failed to raise issue of material fact as to issue of enablement of genus.
Evidence of failures was insufficient when there was no showing that individuals, who were
undergraduate students in the inventor's lab, were skilled in the art.).
66 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention.").
67 Regents of The University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1081 (1998).
68 Id.
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U.S.C. § 112, 1 and the non-obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. A description that does not render a claimed invention obvious
does not sufficiently describe that invention for purposes of § 112,
1.69 But a description that renders obvious a claimed invention does
not necessarily satisfy the written description requirement. 70 Thus, for
biotechnology patents, the written description requirement is but an-
other statutory scenario under which the genus/species issue surfaces.
"If conception of a DNA requires a precise definition, such as by
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,... then a
description also requires that degree of specificity. ' '71
The written description requirement serves to ensure that the in-
ventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied
upon, of the specific subject matter later claimed; how the specifica-
tion accomplishes this is not material. 72 Thus, "an adequate written
description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is
part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating
it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself."' 73 For example,
a "bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it can be obtained
by reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that
[an inventor] was in possession of the DNA. ' 74 However, akin to the
standard for enablement, not every species would need to be de-
scribed in order to describe the genus. 75 Thus, the Federal Circuit has
held that in theory it does not require that the applicant describe ex-
actly the subject matter that she claims, but the applicant must clearly
allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that she in-
vented what is claimed. 76 However, in practice an applicant who is
seeking to patent a nucleotide sequence may find that she is only enti-
tled to the specific sequences that are disclosed.77
69 Id. at 1567.
70 Id.
71 Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.3d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also In re Alton, 76 F.3d
1168, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
72 In re Alton, 76 F.3d. at 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
73 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568; Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171.
74 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171; see also, Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 ("The name cDNA is not
itself a written description; it conveys no distinguishing information concerning its
identity.").
75 Id. at 1568.
76 Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al., 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
77 One should note that in the context of chemical cases, the Federal Circuit has been
clear and imposed a less rigorous standard than in biotechnology cases: "The written
description requirement does not require identical descriptions of claimed compounds, but
it requires enough disclosure in the patent to show one of ordinary skill in this art that the
inventor 'invented what is claimed."' Id., 208 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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In The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, 78 the
two patents in suit related to recombinant DNA technology. The pat-
ents disclosed rat insulin-encoding DNA but claimed broader genuses
and other species' insulin-encoding cDNA, e.g., mammals,
vertebrates, and humans.79 The court held the applicant was not enti-
tled to those claims.
The descriptions of rat insulin cDNA, a general method of pro-
ducing human insulin cDNA, and human insulin A and B chain amino
acid sequences were not enough to claim the human cDNA.80 This
information, if it were in the prior art, would not render the sequence
obvious; therefore, these references could not provide an adequate
written description.81 Similarly, the rat cDNA was not enough to pro-
vide a written description of the genuses of mammalian or vertebrate
cDNA. A precise definition was required for chemical species.82 The
Federal Circuit explained:
In claims to genetic material ... a generic statement such as "verte-
brate insulin DNA" or "mammalian insulin DNA," without more, is
not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not
distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function. It
does not specifically define any of the genes that fall within its defi-
nition. It does not define any structural features commonly pos-
sessed by members of the genus that distinguish them from others.
One skilled in the art therefore cannot, as one can do with a fully
described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of the members
of the genus. A definition by function, as we have previously indi-
cated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indi-
cation of what the gene does, rather than what it is ....
•.. A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means
of a recitation of a representative number of cDNAs, defined by
nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a
recitation of structural features common to the members of the ge-
nus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.
This is analogous to enablement of a genus under § 112, 1, by
showing the enablement of a representative number of species
within the genus. 83
78 119 F.3d 1559.
79 Id. at 1567.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1568.
83 Id. (footnote omitted). See also Fiddes v. Baird, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1483 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1994) (Patent teaching no amino acid or DNA sequences for any mammalian
FGF other than bovine pituitary FGF does not provide written description for the broad
class of FGFs.).
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The strategies for satisfying the written description requirement
are similar to those required for enablement. Applicants and patent
owners should describe as much as possible and argue the similarities
across species. Their adversaries should emphasize the differences be-
tween species and the absence of any species covered by a genus
claim.
The Patent & Trademark Office has not been unsympathetic to
the concerns over the Federal Circuit's firm stance on written descrip-
tion requirements. On December 21, 1999, the Patent & Trademark
Office issued its Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Pat-
ent Applications under 35 U.S.C. §112, 1, "Written Description" Re-
quirement: Request for Comments, in which it attempted to address
practitioners' concerns about the recent developments of the written
description requirement in both the Patent & Trademark Office and
the courts.8 4 On January 5, 2001, the Patent & Trademark Office is-
sued its Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the
35 U.S.C. § 112, f[1, "Written Description Requirement," which super-
seded the interim guidelines. 85 Unfortunately, the guidelines provide
little help, repeatedly stating the Patent Office is bound by Federal
Circuit law. With respect to the troublesome issue of providing a satis-
factory written description to claim a genus, it noted merely that when
one wants to claim a genus, one needs to disclose a sufficient variety
of species, the number will vary inversely with the skill and knowledge
in the art, and for an unpredictable art disclosure of a single species is
not enough to claim the genus.86
The four areas of invalidity described above, as applied to ge-
netic/biotechnology patents, will likely provide the foundation for an-
alyzing future genetic/biotechnology patents, including bioinformatics
patents.
II.
THE INCARNATION OF BUSINESS METHODS PATENTS
Two decades ago, the Supreme Court noted that "laws of nature,
physical phenomenon and abstract ideas" were not patentable.8 7
Based on this statement, one might think that naturally occurring nu-
84 64 Fed. Reg. 71427.
85 66 Fed. Reg. 1099.
86 Id. at 1106.
87 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (The product of "a new bacterium
with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and.., having the poten-
tial for significant utility ... is patentable under [35 U.S.C.] § 101.").
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cleotide sequences are not patentable. But "[a]lthough patent claims
to naturally occurring DNA might be expected to trigger the 'products
of nature' rule, courts have upheld patent claims covering 'purified
and isolated' DNA sequences as new compositions of matter resulting
from invention. ' 88 Thus, "[a]lthough there remain the traditional cate-
gories that have never been viewed as patentable subject matter, viz.,
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, the policy un-
derlying the patent system fosters its application to all areas of tech-
nology-based commerce. '89
In the summer of 1998, in State Street, the Federal Circuit visited
the issue of patentability and made clear that business methods were
not per se unpatentable. 90 The Court also held that any bar to patent-
ing mathematical algorithms was valid "only to the extent that [the
claimed invention] represents an abstract idea." 91 Once a mathemati-
cal algorithm is applied in a useful way, it is patentable. 92 Thus, one of
the themes of State Street was that the 35 U.S.C. § 101 utility require-
ment should not bar the patentability of abstract ideas that, as applied,
generate useful, concrete, or tangible results.
In light of State Street, "many companies are running to the PTO
with Internet-related or e-commerce programs. ' 93 Although these ap-
plications involve the Internet or other computer software, they are
often patents for business methods. "Business methods include the
way a business is structured, managed, organized and/or carried
out."'94 Thus, this may include distribution and sales procedures, sup-
pliers and customer service methods, and business-customized
software and information systems.
State Street, on its face, has nothing to do with biotechnology pat-
ents. The patent at issue involved a method for financial institutions to
pool money and to invest it as a partnership. 95 However, State Street is
not limited to financial or e-commerce businesses. Its holding is now
being and will continue to be felt throughout the patent world. In the
context of genetic/biotechnology patents, this will lead to a significant
88 J. Miller, Patent Law and Human Genomics, 26 CAP. U.L. REV. 893, 907 (1997).
89 Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. et al., 200 F.3d 1374,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
90 149 F.3d at 1375 ("We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived [business
method] exception to rest.").
91 Id. at 1373 n.4.
92 Id.
93 Steven Friedman et al., State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc.: Seeking The Keys To Cyberspace, 589 PLI/Pat 31, 54 (2000).
94 Michael E. Melton, The Business of Business Method Patents, 589 PLI/Pat 97, 102
(2000).
95 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1368.
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increase in biology-related business method patent applications, most
specifically as computer-related bioinformatics patent applications. As
one commentator has noted, "academic institutions and companies
have already recognized the benefits of creating faster and more accu-
rate gene and protein programs, algorithms and databases. ' 96 The
pursuit of patents relating to these benefits is inevitable.
In addition to prompting a flood of bioinformatics patents, the
most important of which someday will be litigated, State Street will
also prove a source of support for litigants who are faced with charges
of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As described above, State Street
implies a policy of viewing the scope of what is patentable as very
broad and not barring activity and products of technology as applied
to the business world. The Patent Office, however, might not be ex-
tending the sentiment of the broad holding of State Street to genetic/
biotechnology patent applications.
On December 21, 1999, the Patent and Trademark Office issued
the Revised Utility Examination Guideline: Request for Comments.97
The requests for comments were prompted by the public comment on
the interim Written Description Guidelines regarding the patentabil-
ity of ESTs.98 Under the interim standard, Examiners were to reject
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if the claimed invention did not have a
well-established utility and there was no credible assertion of specific
and substantial utility by the applicant.99
On March 1, 2000, the Patent Office announced that it was offer-
ing training materials for Interim Written Description and Utility
Guidelines.100 The examples of the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines
Training Materials provide thirteen samples of when applicants may
expect and not expect rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101.101 "With re-
spect to DNA Fragments or ESTs, the USPTO will be looking for a
utility particular to the DNA fragment or EST that exists in a real-
96 Datagheib-Vinarov, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. at 159.
97 64 Fed. Reg. 71440.
98 Id. at 71441. The Patent Office received "[m]any comments (that) stated that suffi-
cient patentable utility has not been shown when the sole disclosed use of an EST is to
identify other nucleic acids whose utility was not known, and the function of the corre-
sponding gene is not known."
99 Id.
100 PTO Offers Training Materials for Interim Written Description and Utility Guidelines,
P.T.O. Press Release #00-15, March 1, 2000. The revised utility guidelines can be found at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offfices/pac/utility/utilityguide.pdf. The period for comment on
the guidelines closed March 22, 2000. Id.
101 Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials are available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/utility/utiltiyguide.pdf.
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world context. '10 2 With respect to single nucleotide polymorphisms,
the focus may be on whether there is a causal relationship between
the variation and the disease.
10 3
On January 5, 2001, the Patent Office issued a revised version of
utility guidelines that superseded the Revised Interim Utility Guide-
lines but emphasized that, for the most part, the Patent Office would
be sticking to the rubric announced in the interim standard, which fo-
cuses on specific, substantial, and credible utility in terms of determin-
ing whether an applicant has complied with 35 U.S.C. § 101.104 The
regulations summarized: "An invention has a well-established utility
(1) if a person of ordinary skill in the art would immediately appreci-
ate why the invention is useful based on the characteristics of the in-
vention (e.g., properties of application of a product or process), and
(2) the utility is specific, substantial, and credible. °10 5 A specific and
substantial utility excludes utilities that are "throw-away," "insubstan-
tial," or "nonspecific";10 6 thus, there is some hurdle being imposed by
the Patent Office. The extent to which this affects the issuance and
validity of patents will surely be developed in future administrative
proceedings and case law. 107
Thus, the tension between the new utility guidelines and the tone
of State Street is clear. With this uncertainty come options for the liti-
gants. And with only a few business method cases decided in light of
102 Thomas J. Kowalski, Analyzing the USPTO's revised utility guidelines, 18 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 349, March (2000).
103 Id. at 350. "With respect to DNA fragments or ESTs, the USPTO will be looking for
a utility particular to the DNA fragment or EST that exists in a real-world context." Id. at
349.
104 66 Fed. Reg. 1092.
In these recent guidelines, a number of comments by the public and responses thereto
by the Patent Office were published. These comments are harbingers of the arguments that
will likely be presented in courts during future biotechnology patent litigations. A signifi-
cant number of them were policy based, and as the Patent Office noted, more appropri-
ately directed to Congress. For example, commentators objected to the patenting of genes
because they are products of nature.
One noteworthy difference, especially for patent prosecutors, between the interim
guidelines and the guidelines that replaced them was that under the newer standard if the
Examiner does not perceive a well-established utility, a rejection should be entered, and
the Examiner need not prove that one does not exist. Id. at 1098.
105 Id. at 1095.
Interestingly, the Patent Office has directed its Examiners to make rejections for a
lack of utility, not only under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but also under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1098.
106 ld. at 1098
107 Although these regulations do not have the effect of law, they will likely be used as
persuasive authority by creative litigators.
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State Street, there is little precedent by which to develop an instinct as
to how those patents will be treated. 10 8
III.
PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND PRACTICE Tips
Regardless of the side on which genetic/biotechnology patent liti-
gants find themselves, they must be prepared for new case law to de-
velop as courts synthesize State Street, more traditional biotechnology
patent doctrine, and the utility requirements as applied to genetic/bio-
technology patents. Bioinformatics patents are a mesh of biology and
computer patents. Applicants and litigants need to determine whether
to emphasize the biology or computer aspects of their inventions. 10 9
Their strategies will depend in part on the answers to questions such
as: Will the Patent Office, and the courts, continue to be lenient in
terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103 and demanding in terms of 35 U.S.C.§ 112, as
they have in the context of biotechnology applications? Will the stan-
dards be different for the business methods type patents, which are
only now beginning to be litigated, and the bioinformatics patents,
which have not been litigated? Will State Street reemphasize that, de-
spite 35 U.S.C. § 101, anything under the sun is patentable if made by
man, 110 or will there be an increased number of rejections based on a
lack of utility in light of the Utility Examination Guidelines issued Jan-
uary 5, 2001?
These questions and others will all be answered as the effects of
the completion of the Human Genome Project are appreciated by so-
ciety, new patent applications (especially bioinformatics patent appli-
cations) are filed and litigated, and the courts apply Patent Law. As
with most developments in the law, the journey will likely be long and
painful, but in genetic/biotechnology patents, entrepreneurs cannot af-
ford to be inattentive.
108 As of March 11, 2001, only five reported court decisions (one in the dissenting opin-
ion) have cited State Street. See Festo v. Skoetsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabuskiki Co., 234 F.3d
228 (Fed. Cir. 2000); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International Game Technology, 184 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 1999); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T v.
Excel Communications, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (D. Del. 1999). Additionally, State Street
has been cited once by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See Ex parte Don-
ner, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1699 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1999).
109 For a suggestion of the types of claims that might be appropriate for bioinformatics
patent applications, see Mark DeLuca, State Street and Its Effect on the Biotechnology
and Bioinformatics industries, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL JOINT PATENT SEMINAR, 1-29 (April
11, 2000).
110 149 F.3d at 1373.
